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The Securities Commission Malaysia issued the Corporate Governance Blueprint which 
is later transformed to Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance ‘MCCG’. Minority 
Shareholders Watchdog Group ‘MSWG’ is participating in the establishment of MCCG 
components as well as the measurement of best practice of corporate governance by 
using Corporate Governance’s index in 2009. This index which has two components of 
internal governance (i.e. disclosures on board of directors’ structure and directors’ 
remuneration) and external governance (i.e. disclosures on accountability and audit as 
well as communication with shareholders) could result to an effective monitoring and 
governance among family-controlled firms. Using MCCG index scores, this study 
examines the relationship between the components of corporate governance and 
performance among Malaysian family-controlled firms for the years 2010 and 2011. 
The regression analysis provide evidence that none of these components are 
significant except directors’ remuneration disclosures which are negatively related to 
family-controlled firms’ performance (i.e. ROA, Tobin Q and EVA). These findings 
indicate that low disclosures of directors’ remuneration are more likely to be related 
to high performance among family-controlled firms given that more investors may be 
attracted to invest in the family businesses with low directors’ remuneration than high 
directors’ remuneration. Hence, the regulators and policy makers may need to 
consider specific corporate governance code for family-controlled firms in order to 
lessen the dominance of agency problems. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The Corporate governance has become an important agenda among Malaysian companies in 
order to be more competitive in their respective industry. The Securities Commission Malaysia issues 
the Corporate Governance Blueprint which is later transformed to Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance ‘MCCG’. Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group ‘MSWG’ is participating in the 
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establishment of MCCG components as well as the measurement of best practice of corporate 
governance by using Corporate Governance’s index which could lead to an effective monitoring and 
governance among family-controlled firms. This index has two components of internal governance 
and external governance. Internal governance component comprises of board of directors’ structure 
and directors’ remuneration dimensions, whereas, external governance component consist of 
accountability and audit as well as communication with shareholders dimensions. Hence, does 
corporate governance result to high performance among public listed companies in Malaysia? 
In Asia, public listed companies are mainly controlled by family that could contribute to high 
performance in Taiwan, Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and China and to a reduction of value gaps 
with socio-emotional wealth (SEW) among family members [1]. Amongst the well-known Asia family 
group companies are the Ayala family (Philippines), Li Ka-Shing (Hong Kong), and Kyuk Ho Shin (South 
Korea). In Malaysia, the prominent Malaysian family businessmen are Robert Kuok (Kuok Brothers) 
or more well-known as ‘Sugar-King’, Quek Leng Chan (Public Bank Group), Tuanku Abdullah Tuanku 
Abdul Rahman (Melewar Group), Tan Sri Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir (Sapura Holdings Berhad), and T. 
Ananda Krishnan (Tanjong Berhad).  
However, agency problem Type 2 is a situation whereby the founding family, being a large and 
controlling shareholder, may choose to pursue its own interest at the cost of other shareholders 
when their interests are not well aligned [2]. In other words, the family-controlled firms may be 
profitable for the controlling families at the expense of minority shareholders. Lane [3] pointed out 
that the family’s presence in ownership and management leads to a low goal divergence between 
owners and managers among family-controlled firms [4].  
Nevertheless, family-controlled firms are (1) external-quasi control due to their obligation to the 
Security Commission’s regulation and guidelines; and (2) internal governance in relation to 
mechanism for the accountability, monitoring, and control of a firm’s management with respect to 
the use of resources and risk taking [5]. Hence, the present study examines whether corporate 
governance does matter among family-controlled firms given that mandatory imposition of MCCG 
on 31st December 2012.  
Specifically, the initial MCCG was improved with rebranding in 2007 (Revised 2009) before 
another proactive measure was taken by the Malaysian government in term of MCCG 2012 
(consistent with the “Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011”) in which it was launched in March 2012 
and would be mandatory to put into effect on 31 December 2012. A few companies have already 
applied this MCCG, others have taken the year 2012 as the mandatory year for listed companies in 
Bursa Malaysia to make reconciliation on these guidelines of MCCG 2012. 
2. Corporate Governance in Malaysian Capital Market   
The principal authorities involved in regulating the capital market are the Bank Negara Malaysia 
(the Central Bank), the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM), Bursa Malaysia (formerly known 
as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), and the Securities Commission. These agencies regulate 
the capital control measure during the Asian economic crisis. The emergence of corporate 
governance (CG) in Malaysian Capital Market was caused by the 1997 Asia financial crisis due to 
speculative in the Asia currency market [6]. Government intervention is in the form of introducing 
the first Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG), that was set up as early as in March 2000 
by the Malaysian High Level Finance Committee of Ministry of Finance (MOF) as a reactive measure 
but the application of MCCG (2001) was in voluntarily basis by forming the watchdog agencies like 
Malaysia Audit Oversight Board (AOB) and Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) [7]. The 
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formation of Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) on 30 August 2000 was another 
episode to foster the best practice of MCCG amongst Public Listed Companies (PLCs) in Bursa 
Malaysia. MSWG is participating in the establishment of CG components as well as the measurement 
of best practice of corporate governance by using CG’s Index. 
 
2.1 MCCG 2007 (Revised 2009)  
 
The Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2007 code is established to further improve 
the listing requirement by Bursa Malaysia that came into force since 1st January 2001. The revised 
principles in the code list are: (1) relationship of the board to management, (2) the board, principal 
responsibilities of the board, (3)supply of information, (4) access to information, (5) access to advice, 
(6) appointments to the board, (7) directors’ training , (8) the level and make-up of remuneration, 
procedure, (9) disclosure, (10) remuneration committees, (11) chairman and chief executive officer, 
(12) internal control, (13) shareholder voting, (14) dialogue between companies and investors, (15) 
the relationship between the board and shareholders, and (16) dialogue between companies and 
investors. The revision of 2007 code took place in 2009 in order to strengthen the roles and 
responsibilities of the board of directors, the audit committee and the internal audit function. 
Besides the current study in Malaysian corporate governance best practices, the main principles 
focused are on the strengthened composition as well as reinforced independence. The dimension of 
the strengthening composition are in the three roles of Nominating Committee namely: (1) 
appointment to the board that is exclusively of non-executive directors and majority must be 
independent directors, (2) criteria used on the recruitment process and annual assessment of 
directors, and (3) attracting and retaining directors by having formal as well as transparent 
remuneration policies and procedures. The dimension of the reinforcing independence are in the 
three board’s mandates namely: (1) assess independent directors annually upon re-admission or self-
interest of directors, (2) limit independent directors of up to a cumulative term of nine years 
otherwise non-independent directors, and (3) separate the chairman and CEO, where both positions 
should be held by different individuals that is not only be not an independent director but must also 
be a non-executive member (MSWG,  2011-MCG Index Report).  
 
2.2 MCCG 2012  
 
In July 2011, the Securities Commission Malaysia issued the Corporate Governance Blueprint 
2011 which outlines recommendation strategic initiatives aimed at reinforcing self and market 
discipline. The Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 is later transformed to the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance 2012 (MCCG 2012) in order to grant mandate for boards to focus on substance 
rather than form in meeting corporate governance requirements that focuses on strengthening 
board structure and composition recognizing the roles of directors as active and responsible 
fiduciaries.  
Board of directors have a duty towards effective stewards and guardians of the company, not just 
in setting strategic direction and overseeing the conduct of business, but also in ensuring that the 
company conducts itself in compliance with laws and ethical values, and maintains an effective 
governance structure to ensure appropriate management of risks and level of internal controls. The 
transformed principles in the code list are establishing clear roles and responsibilities of a board, 
strengthening composition, reinforcing independence, fostering commitment, upholding integrity in 
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financial reporting, recognizing and managing risks, ensuring timely and high quality disclosure, and 
strengthening relationship between company and shareholders.  
3. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The linkage between corporate governance and corporate performance is viewed by Fama [8]. 
He comments that separation of ownership and control can be explained as a result of “efficient form 
of economic organization”.  This conditional concept is explaining the conflict between owners 
(shareholders) and managers (CEO) or it is referred to as Type I agency problem, whereas, in the 
family controlled firm, the conflict is between the large shareholder and minority shareholders or it 
is known as  Type II agency problem. The drawback of the latter practice is that, there is also 
opportunity for dominant shareholders to act that benefited the family members but at the expense 
of minority shareholder [2].  
Jensen [9] are among the pioneer of agency theory that is theoretical postulates concerning the 
relationship between the firm’s ownership structure and firm performance were then further defined 
the theory as “one or more persons (principal) engage another person (agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”. 
Conflict of interests between managers or controlling shareholder, and outside or minority 
shareholders refer to the tendency that the former may extract “perquisites” (or perks) out of a firm’s 
resources and less interested to pursue new profitable ventures. In the same vein, family ownership 
firms will limit managers (agents) ability to manage earnings [10].  
Hence, employing agency theory and using Malaysian Governance and Transparency Index 2009 
(i.e. four dimensions which can be breakdown into three dimensions of governance, and one 
dimension of transparency),  to examine whether corporate governance practices could result to 
effective monitoring and governing among family controlled firms. Previous studies are reviewed and 
four hypotheses are developed in the present study.  
 
3.1 Structure of Board of Directors   
 
Most previous researchers in corporate governance studies have been used different elements 
of board of directors’ structure in order to determine its relationship toward family firm performance. 
A common governance element that was studied previously to describe the board structure is board 
size. There are several mix findings related to the board of directors’ structure and firm performance.  
Chang [11] found that only board size and independent directors have shown positive relationship 
with firm performance, while [12] revealed that only board size and leadership structure were 
positively related to firm performance. In the other hand, [13] discovered negative relationship 
between firm performance and board size. 
Ben-Amar [14] further found that inside ownership and CEO duality were negatively related 
towards the quality of information about corporate governance practice, while board independence 
and firm size were positively associated with disclosure quality. However, there were positive relation 
between firm performance with these nine (9) board directors’ structure elements in separate 
findings by previous researchers excluding for independent directors study by [11]. For instance, 
Mangena [15] illustrated that there is a positive relationship between the frequency of the board 
meetings held and firm performance; Brown ]16] found that there were a positive relationship 
between the disclosures of the frequency of the board and committee meetings and directors’ 
attendance at these meetings to firm performance.  
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Based on these discussions and identified elements from the Malaysian Governance and 
Transparency Index 2009, the relevant hypothesis is as following: 
H1: There is positive relationship between disclosures on board of directors’ structure and 
performance among family-controlled firms. 
 
3.2 Directors’ Remuneration   
 
The primary focus of the previous researchers on executive and directors compensation was the 
level and structural mix of compensation packages and their effect to firm performance [17]. Brown 
[16] found that directors’ remuneration is positively related with the companies’ growth and size. 
The evidences on how the directors’ remuneration in term of long term stock option as compensation 
plan increases the firm’s long term financial performance were explained by the director’s behavior, 
in which those with stock options would be less likely in taking excessive risk in pursuing their 
personal wealth [18]. 
Previous studies indicate a lack of consistency regarding the impact of directors’ remuneration 
on firm performance. For instance, Zhou [19] found a weak relationship between executive 
remuneration and firm performance. Main [20] documented a positive relationship between board 
remuneration and firm performance while Brick [21] found a negative relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and firm performance. However, Jaafar [22] who focus on family-owned 
firms, indicated that directors’ remuneration is positively related to firm performance.  
Based on the above discussion, and also the identified elements from the Malaysian Governance 
and Transparency Index 2009, the relevant hypotheses are as following: 
H2: There is positive relationship between directors’ remuneration disclosures and performance 
among family-controlled firms. 
 
3.3 Accountability and Audit   
 
In the mid-twentieth century is known as the evolution of audit committees, whereby, many 
companies voluntarily created audit committee in order to provide more effective communication 
between the board of directors and external audit [23]. In spite of having small groups within board 
of directors would be helpful in maintaining cohesiveness, being small in size would also lower the 
communication and co-ordination costs [24]. 
Hunt [25] suggested that effective audit committee is the corner stone of public’s confidence in 
corporate governance and financial performance. Thus, companies cannot be tolerated in this 
manner by having directors who cannot contribute and must have one who has the necessary 
experience and knowledge to be member of boardroom [26]).  
Nevertheless, Rezaee [27] viewed that having at least one member of the audit committee with 
financial and accounting skills may not be sufficient enough for committee to understand the nature 
and impacts of complexity of business transactions. Abdullah [28] revealed that the independence of 
audit committee bears positive relationship with firm’s financial performance. In a similar vein, 
Kallamu [29] found that independence of audit committee is positively related to firm performance 
(i.e. ROA).  
Based on the above discussion and identified elements from the Malaysian Governance and 
Transparency Index 2009, the relevant hypotheses are as following: 
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H3: There is positive relationship between accountability and audit disclosures and performance 
among family-controlled firms. 
 
3.4 Communication with Shareholders  
 
Fraudulent activities will be refrained by the financial transparency that provides depositors, 
creditors and shareholders and this important mechanism will be given them credible assurance [30]. 
In the study by Rashid [31] found that the transparent and timely disclosure of information is crucial 
in creating shareholders’ value. Lang [32] noted that analysts’ ratings of corporate disclosure have 
positive relationship with earning performance. According to Botoson [33], the disclosure policies of 
firms positively related to cost of capital. Healy [34] suggested that stock performance is associated 
with the expanded disclosure by firms.  
According to Bollen [35], a firm is considered as good corporate governance when it has high 
scoring in corporate governance index that would be included effective disclosure of information 
which is detailed company profile, corporate governance policy and also provided with certain 
corporate transparent information, for instance, analyst meetings, publication of press release, 
presentation of semi-annual results, and shareholders’ meeting on firm’s website. 
The primary reason of having own company website is to provide investors with financial, as well 
as, non-financial information replacing hard-copy publications and thus eliminating the distribution 
and production cost of print-based documents [35]. According to Zheka [36] who studied on 
elements of transparency in corporate governance namely firm’s website, timeliness of publication 
of annual report, publication of information on auditor have positive effect on firm’s performance.  
In a similar vein, Ezat [37] documented a positive relationship between firm’s performance (i.e. 
profitability) and calendar for future financial events. They concluded that companies with high 
profitability will be encouraged to provide a calendar for the future financial events to reflect their 
good situation to different stakeholders. This situation will eventually lead companies to be more 
sensitive to update their web site.  
Based on the above discussion and also identified elements from the Malaysian Governance and 
Transparency Index 2009, the relevant hypotheses are as following: 
H4: There is positive relationship between communication with shareholders disclosures and 
performance among family-controlled firms. 
 
4. Methodology  
 
The present study examines the public listed firms in Bursa Malaysia that fall under family 
controlled firms in the Main Board, and the ACE (Alternative Certainty Efficiency) markets  (formally 
known as Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation- MESDAQ) for the 
years 2010 and 2011. The sample does not cover multinational or foreign based companies that may 
demonstrate different a level of corporate governance practices depending on its country of origin. 
The finance firms (i.e. banks, insurance, and trusts) are excluded from the present study due to the 
different regulatory requirements and material difference in the type of operations. 
Family-controlled firms are identified based on the definitions by LaPorta [38] who traced out the 
largest shareholder of a company, and followed the criteria for family control proposed by Morck 
[39] which are (1) the largest group of shareholders in a firm is a specific family; and (2) the stake of 
that family is not less than 10 per cent of the voting shares. In addition, Malaysian Governance and 
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Transparency Index 2009 has been used to find the score for Malaysian family-controlled firms. The 
governance dimensions (i.e. 2 elements of board of directors’ structure; 8 elements of directors’ 
remuneration; and 5 elements of accountability and audit, whereas the final dimension is for 8 
elements of communication with shareholders) are collected in order to examine the relationship 
between the corporate governance and family firms’ performance. 
The multiple regressions employed in the present study are as follows: 
ROA   = a + β1 BOD + β2 REM + β3 AA + β4 COM + β5 Size + β6 Cash + εit     (1) 
 
Tobin  = a + β1 BOD + β2 REM + β3 AA + β4 COM + β5 Size + β6 Cash + εit       (2) 
 
EVA   = a + β1 BOD + β2 REM + β3 AA + β4 COM + β5 Size + β6 Cash + εit     (3) 
Note:  
Control variables  = Firm Size (Size) and Cash holdings (Cash) 
MCCG Index          = Board of Directors’ Structure (BOD), Directors’ Remuneration (REM),   
Accountability and Audit (AA), Communication with Shareholders (COM) 
 
5. Findings and Discussions 
 
This section presents the descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and multiple regression 
analysis for the current study based on the independent variables (i.e. BOD, REM, AA and COM) and 
dependent variables (ROA, Tobin Q and EVA). 
 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
The present study has observed the updated relevant data from the annual report that amounted 
to 472 family listed firms. Upon this number, the normalized data is finalized to 404 family listed 
firms. Therefore the data is subjected for 808 family listed firms after cover up for two consecutive 
years (2010 and 2011) on the same 404 family listed firms. The sample comprises of  different sectors  
as follows: (1) 308 firms are specified industries (38.1%); (2) 152 firms are trading/services (18.8%); 
(3) 118 firms are consumer (14.6%); (4) 80 firms are technology (9.9%); (5) 66 firms are properties 
(8.2%); (6) 44 firms are construction (5.4%); (7) 36 firms are plantation (4.5%); and (8) 4 firms (0.5%) 
with 2 each of them are operated in hotel and Infrastructure Project Companies (IPC) industry 
respectively.  
In addition, the descriptive analysis provides evidence on mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum for the independent and dependent variables in the present study. The statistical results 
for the independent variables in Table 2 shows that the mean on the respective governance elements 
are ranked according to its percentage scores. Communication with shareholders is prioritized at the 
highest governance level (60.51%), followed by accountability and audit (50.84%), and board of 
directors’ structure (45.74%). The lowest governance percentage score in family-controlled firms is 
in its director’s remuneration (30.05%). The family-controlled firms also have strong cash holdings 






Journal of Advanced Research in Business and Management Studies 








Summary of Variables and their Measurements 















              Net Income  
      =  _________________ 
          Average Total Assets  
     
         Equity market value  
        + Liability book value 
=    __________________ 
  Equity book value  
        + Liability book value 
  
= Sales-Operating Expenses-
Tax-Financial Requirement , 
or 








(Revised 2009)  
 
MCG-Index (IV) 




Director or Chairman   
Duality  
Senior Independent Director  
Board Meeting  
Committee Meeting   
Attendance at Board and Committee Meeting  
Nominating Committee Independence 
Selection of Directors  
Board and Individual Appraisal  
 
8 ITEMS ON GOVERNANCE REMUNERATION: 
Remuneration Committee Independence  
Disclosure of Executive Director Remuneration  
Mix of Executive Director  
Remuneration 
Performance measures Top 5 Executives’ Remuneration 
Disclosures of Executive Director Remuneration 
Disclosures of Non-Executives Director Fees  
Structure of Non-Executives Director Fees  
Stock Option 
 
5 ITEMS ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUDIT: 
Independence of  Audit Committee Member   
Competencies of Audit Committee Member 
Competencies of Audit Committee Chairman 
Risk Management, Internal Control and Internal Audit 
Whistle Blowing Policy 
 
8 ITEMS OF TRANPARENCY AND INVESTOR RELATION 
COMMUNICATION WITH SHAREHOLDER: 
 
Scorecard: Total 100 scores 










Two points  
 
Two points  
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Timeliness of Release of Annual Financial Results 
Timeliness of Release of Quarterly Financial Results 
Corporate Websites  
Effectiveness of IR  contacts 
Results Briefing to Announce Full Year-Results 
Presence of Key Management at Results Briefing  
Availability of Presentation Material   




















































= natural log of the book 
value     of assets 
 
=securities / total assets 
 
Table 2 





 Variables N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
  Board’s (BOD) Structure 808 0.20 0.77 0.45 0.12 
  Directors’ Remuneration 808 0.10 0.75 0.30 0.14 
  Accountability  and Audit 808 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.12 
  Communication with    Shareholders 808 0.20 1.00 0.60 0.18 
  Return on Assets (ROA) 808 -0.04 0.290 0.05 0.05 
  TOBIN’S Q 808 0.05 2.66 0.78 0.37 
  Economic Value Added (EVA) 808 -0.33 0.11 -0.02 0.04 
  Firm Size 808 11.78 24.72 19.16 1.34 
  Cash Holdings 808 0.02 2.43 0.51 0.41 
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Family firms’ performance models as the dependent variables of this study have different results. 
The overall performances for three models are comparatively explained in terms of contribution 
ratio, actual value of ringgit as well as magnitude results. The present study indicates that return on 
assets model has an average of 5.8 cents in every ringgit of their total assets, whereas, Tobin’s q 
model has even more value to the average of 73 cents in every ringgit of their total assets. However, 
Malaysian family controlled firms have an average of – RM26,700.00 or – RM0.0267 million in 
negative value for their economic value added, which is probably unattractive capital market for 
foreign investors. 
5.2 Correlation Analyses  
 
Governance in board of directors’ structure is highly correlated with governance in directors 
remuneration and governance in accountability and audit, whereas, governance in accountability and 
audit is highly correlated with governance in directors remuneration and governance in 
communication with shareholders. Nevertheless, family firm performance of ROA and Tobin’s Q are 
highly correlated with cash holding. Whereas, family firm’s performance of EVA is highly correlated 
with governance in accountability and audit, firm size and cash holding. However, all these variables 




 BOD REM AA COM ROA TOBIN EVA Size Cash 
BOD 1 0.69** 0.51** -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06* -0.01 -0.03 
REM 0.69** 1 0.50** 0.01 -0.07* -0.08* -0.08* -0.05 -0.04 
AA 0.51** 0.50** 1 -0.32** -0.04 0.05 -0.11** 0.14** 0.03 
COM -0.01 0.01 -0.32** 1 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.13** 0.06 
ROA -0.02 -0.07* -0.04 0.03 1 0.10** 0.37** 0.01 0.20** 
TOBIN -0.05 -0.08* 0.05 0.01 0.10** 1 -0.02 0.22** 0.79** 
EVA -0.06* -0.08* -0.11** 0.04 0.37** -0.02 1 -0.50** 0.14** 
Size -0.01 -0.05 0.14** -0.13** 0.01 0.22** -0.50** 1 0.11** 
Cash -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.06 0.20** 0.79** 0.14** 0.11** 1 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
5.3 Regression Analyses 
 
In order to produce more meaningful outcomes for this dissertation, all secondary data collection 
are subjected to statistical procedure such as sufficient data requirement, data screening and 
transformation, normalization, reliability analyses, and validity analyses. Assumptions such as 
outliers, normality, linearity and autocorrelation are satisfied before the data is analyzed. The results 
of the regression analysis between independent variables and family firms’ performances are 
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ROA   = a + β1 BOD + β2 REM + β3 AA + β4 COM + β5 Size + β6 Cash + εit       (4) 
Tobin  = a + β1 BOD + β2 REM + β3 AA + β4 COM + β5 Size + β6 Cash + εit     (5) 
EVA   = a + β1 BOD + β2 REM + β3 AA + β4 COM + β5 Size + β6 Cash + εit     (6) 
 
Table 4 
Results of estimating corporate governance and family-controlled firms’ performance.   
         Expected sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 






     






     






     






     






     






     






Durbin-Watson  2.012 1.988 2.033 
Adjusted R2  4.3% 65.1% 30.1% 
 
The study expects a positive relationship between governance of board of directors’ structure 
and family firms’ performance models. However, the result of regression analysis find that this 
disclosures has no significant relationship with family firms’ performances. These findings imply that 
board of directors’ structure seems to be irrelevant among family-controlled firms given that boards 
of directors tend to be dominated by family members. These findings are consistent study by 
Abdullah [40] who find lower level of mandatory disclosures (i.e. IFRS disclosures) among family-
controlled firms. Consequently, this high concentration of ownership among of family members 
could lead to Type 2 agency problems which are also known as ‘owner opportunism’ or the 
‘entrenchment effect’ [41]. 
In addition, the present study predicts a positive relationship between director remuneration 
disclosures and family-controlled firms’ performance. The regression analysis provides evidence that 
disclosures related to director remuneration are significantly related to performance among family-
controlled firms in the opposite direction. More interestingly, the three models using ROA, Tobin and 
EVA show consistent results related to director remuneration disclosures. These significant and 
negative coefficients indicate a contradiction whereby directors’ remuneration disclosures as 
required by existing code of governance could reduce the family firms’ performance. In other words, 
these findings imply that low disclosures of directors’ remuneration are likely to be related to high 
performance among family-controlled firms given that more investors may be attracted to invest in 
the family businesses with low directors’ remuneration than high directors’ remuneration. The 
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explanation of these findings could be due to investors that are likely to be risk averse investors who 
favour directors with low remuneration and could generate more profit and better performance in 
the family-controlled firms.  
The study also presumes a positive relationship between (1) accountability and audit disclosures; 
and (2) communication with shareholders disclosures and family firms’ performance. However, Table 
3 which provides no evidence on both relationships imply that accountability and audit, and 
communication with shareholders seem to be irrelevant in the family-controlled firms. The later 
findings are associated to high managerial ownership is unsuitable in Malaysian family business 
environment due to moral hazard problems involving the risk of misallocation of firms’ resources in 
corporate decision making at the expense of minority shareholders [42]. Even though the spirit of 
having communication with shareholders best practice seems to be theoretically commendable, the 
term “shareholders” in this type of concentrated ownership refers to the principal and manager who 




The current status for having MCCG among Malaysian family-controlled firms is satisfied at 
moderate level. However, the regression analysis for the years 2010 and 2011 provide evidence that 
disclosures of corporate governance components are not significantly related to family-controlled 
firms’ performance (i.e. ROA, Tobin Q and EVA), except disclosures of directors’ remuneration. These 
findings imply that MCCG does not seem to be matter for family-controlled firms due to none of the 
governance elements have positive relationship with firms’ performances except for directors’ 
remuneration which is negatively related to performance. In other words, MCCG is less likely to 
reduce the agency problems among Malaysia family-controlled firms. Hence, the regulators and 
policy makers may need to consider specific corporate governance code for family-controlled firms 
in order to lessen the dominance of agency problems. 
As a result, the present study on MCCG among Malaysian family-controlled firms sheds light on 
the issues surrounding corporate governance to researchers, regulators and policy makers based on 
MCCG 2012 rather than MCCG 2017. However, the limitation in methodology may restrict 
generalisability of the findings due to two years sample of firms which could be extended to five or 
ten years in order to provide more significant findings in relation to corporate governance. Future 
research could be done on non-family-controlled firms versus family-controlled firms, and non-
developed countries versus developed countries.  
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